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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
: Case No. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
: Court of Appeals 940060-CA 
vs. : District Court 921400519 
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter on 
rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant seeks rehearing by this Court of the ruling 
sustaining Defendant's conviction of Murder, a First Degree Felony 
upon the ground that this Court has overlooked and misconstrued the 
prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court and has misapplied the law 
to the facts of this case. 
Defendant appealed his conviction for Murder, a First Degree 
Felony, and his resulting sentence of five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison pursuant to Section 76-5-202, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court has held and ruled that the 
Trial Court committed error and abuse of discretion in certain 
particulars, but that the error was "harmless" finding that there 
is no likelihood that the result would have been different absent 
the errors. In addition, this Court held and ruled that the 
evidence at trial was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the 
conviction of the Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REHEARING 
I THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILT 
II THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING "DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE" WAS SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO AND ALSO 
CONSTITUTES "PLAIN ERROR" 
III THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT WHEN 
IN A MEMORY BLACKOUT EPISODE IS HARMFUL ERROR 
IV THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS OF TESTIMONY 
OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERTS RELATING TO THE PROPENSITY 
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT TO VIOLENCE IS HARMFUL ERROR 
V THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCISING PORTIONS OF THE LETTERS 
FROM THE CO-DEFENDANT IS HARMFUL ERROR 
VI ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO EXCLUDE THE 
CHILD ABUSE SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND THE ERROR IS HARMFUL 
VII THE COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE 
VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S HOME IS HARMFUL 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILT 
The on J y v i lour ,", at Lxii.il tlial, ituis IJeitiiidaiil did aiiyl . ng to 
cause the injuries suffered by or the death of fourteen moir :; old 
Faith Barney was base :i :: i :t the testimony c f Rona Harding. n». 
Hai'dix ig testifi e ::! tl : .a I: : she observed fch B Defendant holding the 
infant with the knees drawn toward the chest: and he appeared • v- be 
squeezin lid the '•* - ' -4 - ras t rrying •* :ind w a s red in 
t .*- * ^  . i i I! !i in: c: 1: 1 : If: 111 992. 
The StatP : t i >eor> oi the case on that: tes 
ip!f*d v * • +-H^ *-es-*imc"" s "?i~r! examiner that the child 
„. ;," t-n pvnlaln the 
injuries in - ne s p m o j ligaments Othe: t »,. rhe Defendant's own 
testimony - - * 1 ^ T * ^ t ±U on uhe heau, dxuei t in no 
i ^ was no other evidence of 
treatment of tnis r,; . -> f "he Defended I: (Trial Transcript pp 
-* M Moreover 'HP De^ ^ • '-^ * noil/] ;» about th i s event was 
^ * if « ii i\ 'J i I :i i k i i ig"1"1"" c f the 
c m x a oy t h i s b e i e n a . 
A
^ who o b s e r v e d t h e r h i l r l HID I » 11K? oven inq rill 
I 11 I n | "i ""In i s i y H a i o e y , l e b l L L t i e d I h a t t h e c h i l d 
^eaied r e l a t i v e l y h e a l t h s I I iqqie Karren r the next door neighbor 
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described actions by the child on that evening which were 
inconsistent with the spinal injuries later observed in the 
autopsy, Christy Barney, the only witness besides the Defendant 
who observed the child on the morning of August 5 before 8:00 a.m.f 
testified that when the Defendant left for work, the child appeared 
alright, except for the difficulty breathing which improved before 
she returned the child to her crib. The Defendant had no further 
contact with the child until summoned to the hospital. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 244) 
From the foregoing evidence it cannot be said that the 
elements of depraved indifference murder were supported by the 
evidence. This Court has correctly defined the elements of the 
crime as follows: (1) That the Defendant caused the death; (2) 
That the Defendant's conduct created a grave risk of death to 
another; (3) That the Defendant knowingly created the grave risk 
of death; (4) That the Defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved 
indifference to human life. 
The evidence in this case simply does not support the 
inferences which are necessary to arrive at the verdict rendered. 
The verdict, therefore, must not be allowed to stand. This case is 
in the image of the case of State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1993), where the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the State's evidence simply does not support a 
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reasonable inference that the Workmans had the mental 
state required by the statute for a lawful conviction* 
Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or 
supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Arguing, as the State does, that 
speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred 
Constitutional safeguards at its core. . . [W]hen the 
inference of guilt does not logically flow from the 
evidence, it is incumbent on a reviewing court to set the 
verdict aside 
In Inn Tinninur r a t 9 8 7 . 
T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e a t a l l troiii which in i n f e r t h a t
 (mj 
condiiiL L L i thiu Li i Ldt-iiu.'iMl a di,*(>i avpii i iidi t t e r e n c e 1 u 
hum* I. I i f e a s tie t i iiei i ix „ e v . S t and i f o i < 1, 71 > 9 I'". 2 d 2 5 4 ( Utah 
1988) a s an u t t e i c a l l o u s n e s s toward t h e v a l u e of human l i f e and a 
c i m i f * 1 1 H e i in mi in I II II 1 1 II in I mi mi in in II mi 1 n s wi 1 1 
c r e a t e a wiave r i s k of d e a t h t o anc e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l was 
t h a t De fendan t f s method , * * • ] .
 ajL 
p t i K !«•»' . I i 1
 nt , WUJII uu i , . , . ,, _ j ck 
i n j u r i e s o b s e r v e d i n t h e a u t o p s y , ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t , p , 527) 
'"II In i s C o u r t , in i t s op i it 11 in in iii t h i s i i,< • , c o n s t r u e d iie 
i anq udtf p i 11 alet te v, ignite r IFITT I -in n S t a t e v , wui Lfien , i 11 * j a , 
i n c o r r e c t l y on t h e i s s u e ol l e a s o n a b l e doubt arid i i m i onab le 
a l t e r n a t i v e i o t h e s j s . ' , ^ o r r e c t l y heir" l l , i i 1 • lie 
e v i d e n c e III M Il i I i i-1 I  mi 1111 - " i i y llhivii I  I K i I  I  ill m i i t - M i i m e I s t 1 i s 
t h e p e n p M l i i i l o i III u»r t i n s Lorn I i s in e r r o i in h o l d i n g t h a t 
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the evidence need not exclude every "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis." 
The import of Tanner, infra., Worthen, infra, and Workman, 
supra, is that when the evidence gives rise to a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis other than the guilt of the Defendant, and 
when that hypothesis naturally and reasonably flows from all of the 
evidence in the case and cannot be excluded by the evidence in the 
case, that reasonable alternative hypothesis constitutes reasonable 
doubt as a matter of law. In other words, reasonable men could not 
differ in finding that such an alternative hypothesis is reasonable 
and could exist after a fair consideration of the evidence. The 
only contradiction between the Tanner case and the case of Huerta 
v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982) is the application of 
the term "reasonable". The existence of "a hypothesis" such as in 
Worthen, infra, may not rise to the level of a "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" such as that in Workman, supra, or Tanner, 
infra. 
Reasonable doubt as to who the perpetrator is exists in this 
case as a matter of law. Reasonable men cannot differ in finding 
that, in light of all of the evidence and after a fair 
consideration of that evidence, that it is "reasonable" that Ms. 
Barney, the child's mother, may have caused the death of the child 
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through physiciil 1 i1 after the Defendant left foi work at 5:30 
a.m. on the morning of AucpiFit li, 1992. 
F . on 
the quai * * -fuantity evidence presented t encourage 
t r i a l "onje^ 1^ 0 ,K1i«*hed liy s p e c u l a t i o n • The 
c ii i ml in iIII'.uI Li c i e n c y of 
the evidence. 
THK COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING "DEPRAVED 
INDIFFERENCE" WAS SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO 
AND ALSO CONSTITUTES "PLAIN ERROR" 
This Court he -
o 
actua invi -
statement n 
I 
statement ui m* i* 
insufficier 
i 
statement 
^
sted to aivina th 
s nw '^n '^pir^nr +"}-*•* + +-he r!^4:onse - i ^ p -
I t i l e i i ^ e 
• i : 
chambers discusbi i)i 
Defend^n^ ^ha* 9 Hc alternate 
a rr\rTf*Ct 
>* "** *- - goes' in*' -i i ! 1 nade^uo e imr 
'
r
^i f ferpnrr" nd uidt the 
accurate ^nd 
lie id* >unsei toi i*e tended • specif ical ly 
instruction ii» the forni it wr»e given and the 
• i II mi II Imi in in 1 1 i II | i ' i mi II HI mi mi i i i i ( in m e i n 
ustructions. 
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In fact, the statement that an instruction is a correct 
statement of the law is not a concurrence that it is a good 
instruction. Moreover, counsel for the Defendant urged the Court 
to give the defense's alternate instruction which more adequately 
defined the term "depraved indifference" and so argued to the trial 
Court. That urging fell on deaf ears and the Court gave the 
inadequate instruction #4. To suggest that counsel "invited" the 
error is to ignore the plain facts. 
Furthermore, the instruction #4 is plain error on its face. 
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that this Court 
may take into consideration "plain error" that affects the 
"substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not 
brought to the attention of the Court. State v. Brown, No. 900148 
(Utah 1992); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989). The 
standard in finding plain error requires that first, the error be 
plain, i.e. the record must indicate that it should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. Second, 
the error must affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e. 
that the error is harmful. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 
(Utah 1989). 
Instruction #4 fits this definition precisely. Furthermore, 
plain error was argued by the defense in the main appeal. The 
definition of the element of depraved indifference are certainly 
8 
material in this case. No case could be more plain on its face as 
creating "manifest injustice" than is this case. This Court should 
take up the issue of Instruction No. 4 and should reverse on that 
ground. 
Ill 
THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT WHEN 
IN A MEMORY BLACKOUT EPISODE IS HARMFUL ERROR 
This Court ruled that the trial Court's exclusion of evidence 
of prior violent acts while in a black out state by Christy Barney 
constituted error and an abuse of discretion but that the error was 
harmless. This Court apparently failed to consider that while some 
evidence found its way into the record on that issue, the trial 
Court's ruling still prevented counsel from using that evidence in 
its presentation to the jury. 
First, the trial Courtfs ruling specifically prevented the 
Defendant's expert witnesses from using the evidence of prior 
violent acts as a partial basis for their examination of Ms. Barney 
and their findings as to her condition and propensity for violence. 
Without the ability to testify as to their basis for those 
findings, the entire testimony of the experts was diluted in its 
delivery to the jury. The jury was left to wonder and speculate as 
to how the doctors could arrive at their conclusions about Ms. 
Barney. 
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Moreover, the trial Court's ruling absolutely prevented 
counsel for the Defendant from arguing the evidence to the jury. 
Without the ability to argue Ms. Barney's prior violent acts during 
blackout episodes, the defense was precluded from arguing the nexus 
between Ms. Barney's known proclivity for violent acts during 
blackouts and the probability that Ms. Barney had caused the death 
of this child while not remembering her actions in so doing. 
Argument of the evidence is a most basic right of a Defendant as 
well as of the State. Argument is the opportunity to call to the 
minds of the jury certain segments of evidence which may have 
seemed insignificant at the time of introduction but which are 
important to the fabric of the theory of the case. The preclusion 
from argument, standing alone, is sufficient harm to find this 
particular error of the trial Court "harmful". 
Indeed, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that 
if the defense were allowed to introduce the evidence of Ms. 
Barney's prior history for violence during blackout episodes during 
the testimony of the experts, thereby providing the foundation for 
their findings, that the result would have been the same. 
Certainly, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that if 
the defense were allowed to argue that evidence to the jury in 
light of all of the other evidence in this case that the result 
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would have been no different. The error is harmful and the 
judgment must be reversed. 
IV 
THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS OF TESTIMONY 
OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERTS RELATING TO THE PROPENSITY 
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT TO VIOLENCE IS HARMFUL ERROR 
The defense expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Howell and Dr. 
Richard Wootton, made specific findings relating to the propensity 
or probability of Ms. Barney inflicting the injuries on Faith 
Barney resulting in her death but later having no memory of the 
events. Those findings were based, in part, on Ms. Barney's prior 
history of engaging in bizarre and violent behavior while in 
blackout episodes. The trial Court precluded the experts from 
testifying as to the prior episodes and the violent acts of Ms. 
Barney. 
For the reasons argued in Point III above, that ruling was 
error and this Court has found it to be error and an abuse of 
discretion. The error is harmful because it cuts out the heart of 
the findings and opinions of the expert witnesses and leaves the 
jury to speculate as to the logical basis of the nature of the 
conclusions made. This Court has overlooked the harmful nature of 
this particular error and the resulting speculation to which the 
jury is left. 
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Moreover, this Court has overlooked the fact that the State 
actually led the Court into that error in the argument in support 
of the objection. A holding that such an error is harmless serves 
to encourage the State to continue to create the error with the 
expectation that a conviction is, nevertheless, safe from reversal. 
The error is prejudicial and harmful in this case the conviction 
must be reversed. 
V 
THE COURTfS ERROR IN EXCISING PORTIONS OF THE LETTERS 
FROM THE CO-DEFENDANT IS HARMFUL ERROR 
The letters are a supreme example of evidence which forms an 
indispensable part of the fabric of the defense theory of the case. 
The letters, authored by Christy Barney, demonstrate the different 
and various personalities which Ms. Barney exhibits when in her 
blackout episodes and the way her behavior and manner of thinking 
changes. When the trial Court excised portions of the letters 
which referred to Ms. Barney's prior violent acts, the jury was 
deprived of an opportunity to place those facts into perspective. 
The minor reference which accidently made its way to the jury due 
to an oversight in preparation of the documents for submission 
amounts to firing a slingshot in the face of a tank. 
This Court has held the trial Court ruling to excise those 
portions of the letters to be error. The error is obviously 
harmful due to the lost opportunity by the jury to fit together the 
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changed demeanor of Ms. Barney with the relation of the prior acts 
of violence. One needs only to read the letters, once including 
the excised portions, and once overlooking those portions, to 
understand the harmful nature of that error. 
VI 
ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO EXCLUDE THE 
CHILD ABUSE SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND THE ERROR IS HARMFUL 
This Court has held that admission of the evidence of child 
abuse syndrome was not error because, "Although the evidence of 
abuse was not linked to defendant, the jury could draw reasonable 
inferences therefrom, . . " (Court's opinion, p. 12) 
Apparently, this Court believes that the jury may draw inferences 
from the evidence of abuse that, therefore, the Defendant is the 
abuser. 
In so holding, this Court has overlooked the previous holdings 
of the Utah Supreme Court and the holding of this Court is in 
conflict therewith. In the case of State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that while evidence of 
"battered child syndrome" is admissible in a prosecution for 
causing the death of the child, the relevance thereof is limited to 
proving cause of death and establishing the lack of accident or 
mistake relating to the injuries sustained by the child which 
resulted in death. In so holding, however, the Court went on to 
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say: 
Again we emphasize that: evidence regarding the child's 
physical condition does not directly indicate the 
culpability of any particular defendant. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d at 543 
In the case of State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
Battered child syndrome evidence is not by itself 
probative of who did the battering and, without 
additional evidence, would be inadequate as a matter of 
law to convict. There must be some evidence that the 
defendant charged with the crime was the person who 
inflicted the injury. 
Worthen, Id. at 848 
In other words, the evidence of child abuse syndrome is 
relevant on the issue of cause of death and the lack of an accident 
to explain the injuries. However, unless the injuries to the child 
can be linked to the particular Defendant or unless the history of 
abuse can be attributed to that Defendant, the evidence of child 
abuse syndrome is irrelevant and immaterial on the issue of guilt 
of that Defendant. Moreover, the evidence of prior child abuse 
perpetrated by an unknown person becomes more "prejudicial than 
probative" and should be excluded. 
Of necessity, when proving that a child has suffered from 
"battered child syndrome", one is drawn to the issue of who is 
responsible for the pattern of battering. Frequently evidence of 
the history of battering and evidence of a defendant's prior 
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treatment of the child, i.e. history of battering the child, become 
intertwined. On the subject of admissibility of evidence of the 
defendant's history of treatment of the child, the Court in State 
v. Tanner, supra., stated as follows: 
In cases of child abuse, such as the one before us, 
evidence of specific instances of the defendant's 
treatment of the child is relevant to establish not 
merely a general disposition for violence or ill-will 
towards all children, but to establish a specific pattern 
of behavior by the defendant toward one particular child, 
the victim. 
Tanner, 675 P.2d at 546. 
However, the Court went on to say: 
The two categories of evidence should, of course, be 
corroborative in order to support a conviction. This 
pattern of behavior by the defendant is relevant to 
establishing absence of accident or mistake (as held by 
numerous courts), opportunity, knowledge or the identity 
of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime 
charged. 
Tanner, Id. at 546-7. 
In this case, the two categories of evidence are not 
corroborative. The Trial Court should have excluded the evidence 
of child abuse syndrome in the absence of competent evidence 
linking the abuse to this Defendant. This Court, upon further 
reflection, should hold in accordance with the prior decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court on that subject and reverse the conviction 
in light of the error of the trial Court. 
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VII 
THE COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE 
VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S HOME IS HARMFUL 
This Court has held that the trial Court erred in admitting 
the video tape of Defendant and his home he shared with Ms. Barney. 
In holding that such error was harmless, this Court has apparently 
overlooked the prejudicial effect on the jury to allow the State to 
emphasize the condition of the home and the manner of dress and 
appearance of the Defendant. In addition, the video tape was 
relied upon by the State to illustrate the seeming lack of care 
demonstrated in the tone of voice of the Defendant and that of Ms. 
Barney. None of that was proper and it should not have been 
allowed to prejudice the jury in assessing the evidence. 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has held that when "[a] 11 that 
was implied [by the video] was that the possession of a warrant 
coupled with the shoddy nature of defendant's home made it more 
likely that defendant was guilty, ,f the videotape evidence is 
irrelevant and inadmissible. State v. Britain, 752 P.2d 37, 38 
(Ariz.App. 1988). 
If the evidence admitted in error makes it more likely that 
the Defendant is guilty, how can a reviewing Court say that the 
result would have been the same? In this case, the quantity and 
quality of evidence against the Defendant was, to say the least, 
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not extensive. The error was prejudicial and the conviction should 
be reversed, 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Defendant, by and through his counsel, 
submits that any of the above errors would be sufficiently harmful 
to reverse the conviction. Taken as a whole, the nature of the 
errors of the trial Court form a quantum of harm and the conviction 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with 
the decision of this Court. 
Submitted this /> day of October, 1995. 
D.^OHN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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